to warnings and advice from the Department of Homeland Security. Symptomatic of the more general "duct (tape) and cover" ethos ubiquitous throughout post-9/11 U.S. society, the story provided an interesting context of reception for the screening of Atomic Cafe (Jayne Loader, Kevin Rafferty, and Pierce Rafferty, 1982) in my course on war and the media. Indeed, students were quick to point out the uncanny similarities between 1950s Cold War paranoia and the current cultural anxieties surrounding the "war on terror." The Bush administration s rhetoric prompted the New York Times to point out the "eerily similar" comparisons to the McCarthy years,' and President George W Bush went so far as to invoke the ultimate Cold War signifier of the mushroom cloud in his speech "outlining the Iraqi threat."Ŵ ith the capture of Saddam Hussein, Culf War II, as Time magazine called it,^ provided the denouement for the Culf War miniseries begun by Ceorge W Bush's father. At the same time, although the president has announced the end of the "hot" war in Iraq, he has also prepared the U.S. public for an endless "war on terror." In the post-9/11 era, the mainstream media have uncritically embraced the Bush administration's Orwellian nightmare of civil and human rights abuses, militarism, isolationism, and anti-intellectualism,'* while also actively promoting the "war against terror" for ratings and profit. The currently unprecedented level of concentration of media ownership in the hands of a few transnational conglomerates and the existence of a military-industrial-media-entertainment network' further facilitates the implementation of a Cold War logic of "us" against "them" in the context of the Manichean rhetoric of good versus evil (doers).
Although a great deal of media attention was given to criticism by Hollywood celebrities of the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, the film divisions of the major media conglomerates expressed their eagerness to become part of the war effort from the outset. Variety reported in October 2001 that "government intelligence specialists [were] secretly soliciting terrorist scenarios from top Hollywood filmmakers and writers" through "a unique ad hoc working group"^ at the Institute for Creative Technology at the University of Southern California. Its members were U.S. Army officials and writers and directors of Die Hard (John McTieman, 1988) , MacGyver (ABC, 1985-92) , and Delta Force One (Joseph Zito, 1999) . In a November meeting with presidential adviser Karl Rove and executives from all the major media conglomerates, the head of the Motion Picture Association of America, Jack Valenti, reminded participants of the global scope of his industry's media imperialism: "We are not limited to domestic measures. The American entertainment industry has a unique capacity to reach audiences worldwide with important messages."Î n the wake of 9/11, Valenti announced that Hollywood would not be making films that portrayed Islamic terrorists so as to prevent a backlash against "the decent, hard-working, law-abiding Muslim community in this country."* Hollywood had already done its ideological work in this regard by showing racist, essentialist, and Orientalist representations of Arabs and Islam for decades.^ Indeed, the limited repertoire of images of and narratives about Arabs and Islam before and during the "war on terror" has served to keep much of the U.S. public ignorant about Arab and Islamic culture, thus paving the way for the dehumanizing and demonizing of the "enemy" as part of the inexorable march toward the hot and cold wars on terror. And although the film industry claimed it would absent representations of terrorists, the television production divisions and networks within the media oligopolies have regularly depicted terrorism in both news and entertainment programming.
In an attempt to gamer popular support for its existence and budget in the postSoviet and pre-9/11 era, the CIA actively solicited and nourished intelligencerelated TV and film projects by employing a former CIA officer in Latin America as a full-time entertainment liaison officer.'" Like the underwriting and collaboration by the Congress for Cultural Freedom with artists during the Cold War," programs produced with the support of the new collaborators serve as effective propaganda and desirable publicity for the CIA and, more recently, the "war on terror."
The canceled CBS series The Agency had been developing its scripts in close consultation with the CIA and even shot part of its pilot episode inside the actual CIA headquarters. Throughout its run. The Agency did not question the validity of the CIA; rather, the series ultimately functioned as a public relations vehicle for the agency. According to the program s creative supervisor, Wolfgang Peterson (Das Boot, 1981; Air Force One, 1997}, "Now that the Cold War is over, people are questioning whether we need a CIA and this is a great opportunity to get the word out."'^ Although airing of the pilot episode of The Agency was postponed because its terrorist plot, including a reference to Osama bin Laden, "too closely resembled reality," focus groups rated the episode much higher after 9/11 because, according to Leslie Moonves, president of CBS Entertainment, people were in the mood for a "patriotic episode, with bad guys and good guys," in which "the CIA thwarts the evil terrorists.""
The ABC series Threat Matrix-which refers to the real report the president receives each morning prioritizing threats to the nation-has been promoted as "the first prime time series to take on post-9/H American society, focusing on the heroism and the humanity of people who dedicate their lives to saving the country from ongoing terrorist threats."" According to Broadcasting 6-Cable, members of the Department of Defense and of Congress are consultants on the program, which also employs former deputy director of the National Security Agency Bill Crowell.'^ As Cynthia Fuchs has noted, "Any remotely counter-administration thinking that filters into Threat Matrix is cut short: patriotism means you toe the line."'® This positive public relations and propaganda for the Department of Homeland Security, the CIA, and the Bush administration is particularly sinister in the context of the recent passage of the Patriot Act.
While The Agency and Threat Matrix approach reality through fiction, ABC enhsted film and television producer Jerry Bruckheimer (Crimson Tide, 1995; Armageddon, 1998; Enemy of the State, 1998, CSI, 2000-), along with Caps (1989-) creator Bertram Van Munster, to produce a reality series featuring actual soldiers fighting the war in Afghanistan.'^ The short-lived result. Profiles from the Front Line, adopted the codes and conventions of the current cycle of reality programs that use follow-up interviews, music soundtracks, fly-on-the-wall recordings of "private" conversations, and "characters" chosen with their narrative potential in mind. Although the blurring of generic boundaries has been an implicit theme in many post-9/11 shows, the particular conflation of entertainment with news in Profiles created tensions between the WB production team that shot the series and the ABC news division, which felt it should have had access to any footage considered newsworthy. One could view Profiles as a calculated or controlled form of reporter "embedding," which in its normal manifestations during the war in Iraq became, "most obviously, a next step from Cops, when the officer-here the terse, camouflaged troop-pauses in his work to explain what he's doing to an inquiring mind."'* As I have argued elsewhere about Operation Desert Storm, most media scholars analyzed Culf War TV news in order to expose its fictions but largely overlooked fictional programming, thus implicitly accepting the generic hierarchies that the television industry both assumes and constructs.'^ A similar trend toward focusing primarily on news programming is occurring during the current cold war. Moreover, a more complete critique of botb news and nonnews programming would benefit from being plotted along a broader discursive continuum tbat includes Web sites, films, music, speeches, parades, T-shirts, magazines, and the other texts that comprise the cultural production of the "war on terror."^"
During the U.S. attacks on Afghanistan, the conservative family drama 7th Heaven (1996-), on WB, attempted to "put a real face on the war against terrorism" by including an emotional memorial with the actual widow and son of a U.S. marine who was killed in a driving accident in Afghanistan. The episode, entitled "The Known Soldier," begins with Ruthie, the daughter in the show, producing a video letter to her pen pal marine while singing along to the Tom Petty song "I Won't Back Down." The episode concludes with Ruthie's video reprising the song, thus framing the show in the context of the themes of revenge and violence epitomized by the "America Fights Back" news logos ubiquitous on television coverage during the war in Afghanistan. At the same time, this family-friendly program is well suited genericaUy, ideologically, and pohtically to the project of helping famihes on the domestic front "cope."
More important for my current concerns, the WB network adopted an exphcitly pedagogical role for this episode by constructing and promoting a companion Web site on its sister company's TumerLearning.com. Sponsored by Target (wbose logo becomes sligbtly ironic in tbe context of tbis episode) and presented as an "educational guide" for parents, teachers, and administrators, the first link includes a taping rights agreement that is conditional on compliance with the curriculum.^' This is an excellent example of the ways in which a media conglomerate hke AOL Time Warner could exploit "convergence" in an explicit attempt to control and contain the 7th Heaven episode's polysemy in the context of war.
The 7th Heaven Web site is just one example of a new kind of intermediality in which the Web bas become an integral part of the production and reception of television. In the case of "Operation Iraqi Freedom," the Web became a significant rival to television as a source of information for many U.S. viewers. The cable news channels have increasingly adopted a Web page aesthetic by cramming text and images into eacb frame, and the major networks routinely invite viewers to log on to their complementary or supplementary Web sites for more information or multimedia presentations. Tbe inclusion on tbe CNN Web site of several television feeds also enabled Culf War II viewers to cboose tbeir own sbots to look at, thus turning TV spectators into interactive armchair imperialists. This is only the latest manifestation in a long history of screen practices dating back to at least the apparatus of early cinema and the Spanish-American War in the 1890s that have enabled Americans to participate vicariously in the U.S. imperial project as a mediated and exotic spectacle.^^ In this context, the reception of war can be viewed as a form of interpassivity in which Web "users" are encouraged to codirect the war (show) on terror, thereby actively embracing and constructing the dominant ideologies of consumerism, nationalism, and hypermilitarism through this new intermediality.
The emergence of the newer media of the Internet and the Web^ not only have afforded mainstream media such as WB and CNN new modes of representation but have also provided new opportunities for the expression of dissent, new avenues of distribution for audio and video, and alternative representations of war unavailable during previous major U.S. conflicts.^'' To offer one prominent example, the video of Daniel Pearl's torture and murder, which was self-censored by the mainstream media, was uploaded in its entirety to several Web sites and made available through peer-to-peer file-sharing networks. Web sites also circulated images challenging the instantaneous electronic historiography of the "fall of Baghdad" by revealing that there were very few celebrants outside the televisual frame. In addition, during the 2003 war discussions, Arab and Arab American Web sites offered a wide range of dissenting views,^ as did online articles and blogs from hbertariaris and the Left. The satellite distribution of Al-Jazeera and other pan-Arab cable network programming also offered important alternative images to those shown on U.S. networks (most notably images of dead and injured Iraqi civilians). By including Arab perspectives and voices, these images provided different contexts for understanding the U.S. invasion of Iraq and its mediation.
By offering this rather bleak account of wartime media culture, it is not my intention to argue that television spectators are passive "cultural dupes" unable to resist ideological messages, or that the Internet presents an updated version of the "hypodermic needle" model of communication. Rather, I am suggesting that the polysemy of the "war on terror text" was severely constrained or "managed," and consequently-like the Bush administration's pohcies toward Iraq-offered httle room for negotiation. Although the new intertexts available on the Web and Arab satellite networks provided dissenting viewpoints, the complicity between U.S. media conglomerates, the government, and the mihtary^^ created a context of reception with hmited possibilities for oppositional or poHtically progressive readings.
Notes

